Modern constitutionalism concerns the constitution of political authority and the limitation of governmental power through law. These concerns also inform earlier theories of political founding, including contractarian accounts of the origins and legitimacy of political authority. This study aims to demonstrate that Locke’s liberal theory of constitution provides the intellectual ground for the two principal tenets of modern constitutionalism: its democratic and liberal dimensions. It lies in Locke’s revisions to Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty. First, unlike Hobbes, Locke conceptualizes the people not merely as a form of sociality that exists only through the sovereign’s representation and otherwise amounts to nothing more than a multitude, but as a constituent power capable of existing even in the absence of government. Second, the problem of sovereignty, which Hobbes formulates through the logic of infinite regress, leads, for Locke, to an unacceptable model of unlimited government. Such a government, for Locke, remains in the state of nature precisely because of its unlimited discretionary capacity, much like Hobbes’s absolute sovereign. The principle of limited government—which alone renders the democratic principle of constitutionalism meaningful—reveals the distinctive character of Locke’s liberal constitution. Finally, Locke’s constitution also makes it possible to conceive the constitution beyond the principles of constitutionalism. Unlike Hobbes’s sovereign, Locke’s political universe allows us to conceive a political entity capable of limiting governmental power without itself becoming unlimited—as expressed in contractarianism, without becoming the judge in its own case. This, in turn, may lead us toward the idea of a written constitution grounded in Locke’s inalienable rights.
Modern constitutionalism concerns the constitution of political authority and the limitation of governmental power through law. These concerns also inform earlier theories of political founding, including contractarian accounts of the origins and legitimacy of political authority. This study aims to demonstrate that Locke’s liberal theory of constitution provides the intellectual ground for the two principal tenets of modern constitutionalism: its democratic and liberal dimensions. It lies in Locke’s revisions to Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty. First, unlike Hobbes, Locke conceptualizes the people not merely as a form of sociality that exists only through the sovereign’s representation and otherwise amounts to nothing more than a multitude, but as a constituent power capable of existing even in the absence of government. Second, the problem of sovereignty, which Hobbes formulates through the logic of infinite regress, leads, for Locke, to an unacceptable model of unlimited government. Such a government, for Locke, remains in the state of nature precisely because of its unlimited discretionary capacity, much like Hobbes’s absolute sovereign. The principle of limited government—which alone renders the democratic principle of constitutionalism meaningful—reveals the distinctive character of Locke’s liberal constitution. Finally, Locke’s constitution also makes it possible to conceive the constitution beyond the principles of constitutionalism. Unlike Hobbes’s sovereign, Locke’s political universe allows us to conceive a political entity capable of limiting governmental power without itself becoming unlimited—as expressed in contractarianism, without becoming the judge in its own case. This, in turn, may lead us toward the idea of a written constitution grounded in Locke’s inalienable rights.
Locke; Hobbes; liberalism; constitutionalism; constitution