Brain–computer interface (BCI) technology was initially confined to healthcare applications but has gradually expanded into fields such as entertainment, digital gaming, and the defence industry. This expansion has led to growing academic and interdisciplinary interest in the technology. The expanding range of applications of BCI technology makes it necessary to consider not only its current uses but also potential future forms of use and the associated risks, such as threats to cognitive privacy and cyberattacks. The fundamental significance of BCI technology in this study lies in the fact that it presents a form of action that differs from the traditional understanding of action. Users communicate with the outside world and act upon their environment via robotic limbs, prostheses, and other digital systems. In this process, actions are executed through computer systems directed by brain signals. Direct bodily execution through limb movement is therefore not necessary for action in the traditional sense. This study examines the functions and applications of BCI technology and discusses its relationship with the concept of action within the framework of four fundamental problems. Firstly, it addresses what the indirect realisation of intention means from the perspective of the causal theory of action. Secondly, it examines whether BCI-mediated actions should be classified as basic or non-basic actions. Thirdly, the study discusses how legal responsibility should be attributed when actions occur without direct involvement of the body and muscular system. Finally, it considers who bears responsibility for actions that arise in scenarios involving external intervention, such as neurohacking.
Brain–computer interface (BCI) technology was initially confined to healthcare applications but has gradually expanded into fields such as entertainment, digital gaming, and the defence industry. This expansion has led to growing academic and interdisciplinary interest in the technology. The expanding range of applications of BCI technology makes it necessary to consider not only its current uses but also potential future forms of use and the associated risks, such as threats to cognitive privacy and cyberattacks. The fundamental significance of BCI technology in this study lies in the fact that it presents a form of action that differs from the traditional understanding of action. Users communicate with the outside world and act upon their environment via robotic limbs, prostheses, and other digital systems. In this process, actions are executed through computer systems directed by brain signals. Direct bodily execution through limb movement is therefore not necessary for action in the traditional sense. This study examines the functions and applications of BCI technology and discusses its relationship with the concept of action within the framework of four fundamental problems. Firstly, it addresses what the indirect realisation of intention means from the perspective of the causal theory of action. Secondly, it examines whether BCI-mediated actions should be classified as basic or non-basic actions. Thirdly, the study discusses how legal responsibility should be attributed when actions occur without direct involvement of the body and muscular system. Finally, it considers who bears responsibility for actions that arise in scenarios involving external intervention, such as neurohacking.
Causal theory of action; brain-computer interface technology; responsibility; neurohacker; free will